Full Vanguards is intended for use by long-lived onion services, which intend to remain in operation for longer than one month.
Full Vanguards achieves this longer expected duration by having two layers of additional fixed relays, of different rotation periods.
The rotation period of the first vanguard layer (layer 2 guards) is chosen such that it requires an extremely long and persistent Sybil attack, or a coercion/compromise attack.
The rotation period of the second vanguard layer (layer 3 guards) is chosen to be small enough to force the adversary to perform a Sybil attack against this layer, rather than attempting to coerce these relays.
Consider an adversary with the following powers:
- Can launch a Sybil guard discovery attack against any position of a rendezvous circuit. The slower the rotation period of their target position, the longer the attack takes. Similarly, the higher the percentage of the network is controlled by them, the faster the attack runs. - Can compromise additional relays on the network, but this compromise takes time and potentially even coercive action, and also carries risk of discovery.
We also make the following assumptions about the types of attacks:
A Sybil attack is observable by both people monitoring the network for large numbers of new relays, as well as vigilant hidden service operators. It will require large amounts of traffic sent towards the hidden service over many many test circuits.
A Sybil attack requires either a protocol side channel or an application-layer timing side channel in order to determine successful placement next to the relay that the adversary is attempting to discover. When Tor's internal protocol side channels are dealt with, this will be both observable and controllable at the Application Layer, by operators.
The adversary is strongly disincentivized from compromising additional relays that may prove useless, as active compromise attempts are even more risky for the adversary than a Sybil attack in terms of being noticed. In other words, the adversary is unlikely to attempt to compromise or coerce additional relays that are in use for only a short period of time.
Given this threat model, our security parameters were selected so that the first two layers of guards should take a very long period of time to attack using a Sybil guard discovery attack and hence require a relay compromise attack.
On the other hand, the outermost layer of guards (the third layer) should rotate fast enough to require a Sybil attack. If the adversary were to attempt to compromise or coerce these relays after they are discovered, their rotation times should be fast enough that the adversary has a very high probability of them no longer being in use.
When a hidden service picks its guard relays, it also picks an
additional NUM_LAYER2_GUARDS-sized set of middle relays for its
second_guard_set, as well as a NUM_LAYER3_GUARDS-sized set of
middle relays for its
When a hidden service needs to establish a circuit to an HSDir,
introduction point or a rendezvous point, it uses relays from
second_guard_set as the second hop of the circuit and relays from
third_guard_set as third hop of the circuit.
A hidden service rotates relays from the 'second_guard_set' at a uniformly random time between MIN_SECOND_GUARD_LIFETIME hours and MAX_SECOND_GUARD_LIFETIME hours, chosen for each layer 2 relay. Implementations MAY expose this layer as an explicit configuration option to pin specific relays, similar to how a user is allowed to pin specific Guards.
A hidden service rotates relays from the 'third_guard_set' at a random time between MIN_THIRD_GUARD_LIFETIME and MAX_THIRD_GUARD_LIFETIME hours, as weighted by the max(X,X) distribution, chosen for each relay. This skewed distribution was chosen so that there is some probability of a very short rotation period, to deter compromise/coercion, but biased towards the longer periods, in favor of a somewhat lengthy Sybil attack. For this reason, users SHOULD NOT be encouraged to pin this layer.
Each relay's rotation time is tracked independently, to avoid disclosing the rotation times of the primary and second-level guards.
The selected vanguards and their rotation timestamp MUST be persisted to disk.
We set NUM_LAYER2_GUARDS to 4 relays and NUM_LAYER3_GUARDS to 6 relays.
We set MIN_SECOND_GUARD_LIFETIME to 30 days, and MAX_SECOND_GUARD_LIFETIME to 60 days inclusive, for an average rotation rate of 45 days, using a uniform distribution. This range was chosen to average out to half of the Guard rotation period; there is no strong motivation for it otherwise, other than to be long. In fact, it could be set as long as the Guard rotation, and longer periods MAY be provided as a configuration parameter.
From the Sybil rotation table in statistical analysis, with NUM_LAYER2_GUARDS=4, it can be seen that this means that the Sybil attack on layer3 will complete with 50% chance in 18*45 days (2.2 years) for the 1% adversary, 180 days for the 5% adversary, and 90 days for the 10% adversary, with a 45 day average rotation period.
If this range is set equal to the Guard rotation period (90 days), the 50% probability of Sybil success requires 18*90 days (4.4 years) for the 1% adversary, 4*90 days (1 year) for the 5% adversary, and 2*90 days (6 months) for the 10% adversary.
We set MIN_THIRD_GUARD_LIFETIME to 1 hour, and MAX_THIRD_GUARD_LIFETIME to 48 hours inclusive, for an average rotation rate of 31.5 hours, using the max(X,X) distribution. (Again, this wide range and bias is used to discourage the adversary from exclusively performing coercive attacks, as opposed to mounting the Sybil attack, so increasing it substantially is not recommended).
From the Sybil rotation table in statistical analysis, with NUM_LAYER3_GUARDS=6, it can be seen that this means that the Sybil attack on layer3 will complete with 50% chance in 9*31.5 hours (15.75 days) for the 1% adversary, ~4 days for the 5% adversary, and 2.62 days for the 10% adversary.
See the statistical analysis for more analysis on these constants.